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ABSTRACT 
The increasing complexity and autonomy of modern vehicles make security 
a key issue of the design and development in the automotive industry. A 
careful analysis of the security requirements and adequate mechanisms for 
ensuring integrity and confidentiality of data are required to guarantee 
safety. In the automotive domain, AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System 
ARchitecture) is the standard de facto. It provides a component-based 
system design at different levels of abstraction. 
In this thesis a library has been developed to implement the Crypto Service 
Manager (CSM) of AUTOSAR. It offers a standardized access to 
cryptographic services for applications. The library is implemented in 
C-language and supports the modules for MAC generation/verification and 
encryption/decryption, according to the standard. In particular, modelling 
extensions in AUTOSAR are proposed to address confidentiality and 
integrity security constraints at the design stage. Software components are 
automatically extended according to security annotations with security 
elements (ports and interfaces), used to call the CSM functions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Nowadays modern cars include technologies for the interconnection with 
the outside world, which provides new functionalities for users. These 
features help drivers to monitor the status of the vehicles and are helpful 
for supporting safety. An example of these functionalities is the vehicle 
telematics. It is a method of monitoring a vehicle. It combines a GPS system 
with on-board diagnostics to record and map car’s position and speed. If the 
3G network is available on the vehicle, it can be used together with the 
telematics to send and receive data to a central management system. The 
telematics can also include functionalities for live weather, traffic and 
parking on the dashboard, apps, voice-activated features and even 
Facebook integration. However, with this increased connectivity, also the 
potential security threats increase. 
The starting point for the security analysis objective of this thesis is the fact 
that an adversary already obtained the access to the CAN 1 . It’s a hard 
assumption, but it has been shown that such intrusion is possible with 
different attacks. Several papers studied car’s vulnerabilities, [1] shows how 
                                                   
1  A Controller Area Network (CAN bus) is a vehicle bus standard designed to 
allow microcontrollers and devices to communicate with each other in applications without a host 
computer. 
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they can be exploited. Authors focused on 3 possible intrusion scenarios, 
involving: 
 Indirect physical access; 
 Short-range wireless access; 
 Long-range wireless access. 
The first kind of vulnerability involves the On-Board Diagnostic port OBD-II2 
and the Entertainment system (Disc, USB and iPod). It’s the easiest attack, 
but also the one with the shortest window of opportunity.  
The short-range wireless access involves short-range connection, such as 
Bluetooth, Remote Keyless Entry, Tire pressure, RFID car keys and Emerging 
short-range channels. For all these channels, if a vulnerability exists (as it is) 
in the ECU software responsible for parsing channel messages, then an 
adversary may compromise the ECU (and, by extension, the entire vehicle) 
simply by transmitting a malicious input within the automobile’s vicinity. 
Long-range wireless access involves long distance (greater than 1km) digital 
access channels, such as Broadcast channel and addressable channels. The 
first category comprehends channels which are not specifically directed 
towards a given automobile, but can be “tuned into” by receivers 
                                                   
2 The OBD-II standard specifies the type of diagnostic connector and its pinout, the electrical 
signalling protocols available, and the messaging format. It also provides a candidate list of vehicle 
parameters to monitor along with how to encode the data for each. 
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on-demand. In addition, attackers may command multiple receivers at once 
and don’t require to obtain precise addressing for their victims. In general, 
these channels are implemented in automobile’s media system (radio, CD 
player, satellite receiver) which frequently provides access via internal 
automotive networks to other key automotive ECUs. The second category 
of channels are perhaps the most important part of long-range wireless 
attack surface, as they are exposed by the remote telematics system that 
provide continuous connectivity via cellular voice and data networks. The 
features which these channels support are crash reporting, diagnostics (e.g. 
early alert of mechanical issues), anti-theft (remote track and disable) and 
convenience (weather and driving directions). These cellular channels offer 
many advantages for attackers, they can be accessed over arbitrary distance 
in a largely anonymous fashion and are individually addressed [1].  
This thesis is conceptually divided into 4 parts. The first one explores 
AUTOSAR, the actual standard for the modelling and developing of vehicle’s 
applications.  The second part shows a simple use case, where all the 
concepts stated in the first part are used and an analysis of the possible 
threats which may affect the system is reported. The use case analyzed is 
the Front Light Management System [2]. In particular, connections have 
been inspected. After the modelling phase of the system, according to the 
current standard, a safety and security analysis has been performed. The 
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next step performed has been the identification of possible threats 
following the standard S.T.R.I.D.E. threat category [3], starting from that, a 
possible attack tree has been designed.  The risk analysis performed on the 
attack tree follows the statement of the European Project EVITA [4], which 
suggests a way to estimate the attack’s potential of the possible threats over 
the attack tree designed. The third part of the thesis has the aim of 
inspecting how AUTOSAR allows users to include security during the 
modelling phase. This can be done through an AUTOSAR service called 
Crypto Service Manager, which provides cryptographic functionalities to 
applications. It will be discussed how the official method is complex and 
error-prone. An extension of the security modelling concepts currently 
available in AUTOSAR is proposed. Developers specify integrity and 
confidentiality security requirements by adding security tags in the 
description field of AUTOSAR software components. A tool for the 
automatic generation of security elements from the security annotations 
will be presented. The last part of the thesis proposes a possible 
implementation of the AUTOSAR Crypto Service Manager, in particular the 
Mac Interface, the Symmetrical Block Interface and the Symmetrical 
Interface have been developed. The implementation proposed follows the 
AUTOSAR standard. 
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This work was conducted as part of the European project SAFURE [5] (Safety 
And Security By Design For Interconnected Mixed-Critical CyberPhysical 
Systems). The project targets the design of cyber-physical systems by 
implementing a methodology that ensures safety and security "by 
construction". The goals of the SAFURE project are the following: 
 to implement a holistic approach to safety and security of embedded 
dependable systems, preventing and detecting potential attacks; 
 to empower designers and developers with analysis methods, 
development tools and execution capabilities that jointly consider 
security and safety; 
 to set the ground for the development of SAFURE-compliant 
mixed-critical embedded products.
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2 AUTOSAR 
Modern cars have up to 80 different ECUs 3  interacting with each other 
through a complex wired network. ECUs are made by diﬀerent 
manufacturers and each ECU has a software embedded in it, which provides 
a speciﬁc functionality. For these reasons, software of an ECU could not 
work on a diﬀerent manufacturers’ ECU, this means that software is not 
portable. Additionally, the increasing number of ECUs (in some top of the 
line models there are more than 100 such devices) and the increasing 
complexity of embedded software, increase the complexity of the car’s 
software development process, both in time-to-market and in the final cost. 
Because of this, AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture) has 
been founded. 
AUTOSAR is a worldwide development partnership of automotive 
interested parties founded in 2003. Some of AUTOSAR partners are BMW, 
Bosch, Continental, General Motors, Volkswagen, Ford, Toyota and Renault. 
It pursues the objective of creating and establishing an open and 
standardized software architecture for automotive electronic control units. 
                                                   
3 ECU (Electronic Control Unit): is a generic term for any embedded system that controls one or 
more of the electrical system or subsystems in a motor vehicle (e.g. Door Control Unit, Human 
Machine Interface, Telematics Control Unit, and so on) 
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2.1 AUTOSAR ARCHITECTURE 
As shown in Figure 1, AUTOSAR has a three-layer architecture [6]: 
1. Application layer; 
2. Runtime Environment (RTE) layer; 
3. Basic Software (BSW) layer. 
The application layer contains the Software Components (SWCs), pieces of 
information providing specific functionalities. The RTE layer is the 
middleware, which provides a communication abstraction for SWCs. BSW 
provides basic services and basic software modules to SWCs. 
SWCs can’t access to BSW directly, all communications, both between SWC-
SWC and SWC-BSW, have to pass through the RTE. Because of the RTE 
abstraction layer, SWCs can be developed independently of the underlying 
hardware, so software providing specific functionalities may be reused on 
vehicle having ECU made by different vendors. 
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Figure 1: AUTOSAR: three-layer Architecture 
 
2.1.1 Application Layer 
In AUTOSAR, “application” software [7] is conceptually located above the 
AUTOSAR RTE and consists of: 
 AUTOSAR application software-components, that are ECU and 
location independent; 
 AUTOSAR sensor-actuator components, that are dependent on ECU 
hardware and thus not readily relocatable for reasons of 
performance/efﬁciency. 
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Due to the RTE Abstraction Layer, they can be implemented independently 
of the underlying hardware. Software components encapsulate the 
implementation of their functionality and behavior and they expose well-
deﬁned connection points, called PortPrototypes, which are the only mean 
through which they can communicate with the outside world. Figure 2 
shows a graphical representation of a SWC in AUTOSAR. 
 
Figure 2: AUTOSAR: Graphical rapresentation of a SWC 
The main communication paradigms between software components are 
client/server, for operation-based communication, and sender/receiver, for 
data-based communication: 
 Sender-receiver communication involves the transmission and 
reception of signals consisting of atomic data elements that are sent 
by one component and received by one or more components. A 
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sender-receiver interface can contain multiple data elements. 
Sender-receiver communication is one-way: any reply sent by the 
receiver is sent as a separate sender-receiver communication; 
 Client-server communication involves, the client which is the require 
(or user) of a service and the server that provides the service. The 
client initiates the communication, requesting that the server 
performs a service, transferring a parameter set if necessary. The 
server, in the form of the RTE, waits for incoming communication 
requests from a client, performs the requested service and 
dispatches a response to the client’s request. The invocation of a 
server is performed by the RTE itself when a request is made by a 
client. The invocation occurs synchronously with respect to the RTE 
(typically via a function call) however the client’s invocation can be 
either synchronous (wait for server to complete) or asynchronous 
with respect to the server. 
2.1.2 RTE Layer 
The RTE [6] provides the infrastructure services that enable communication 
to occur between AUTOSAR software components as well as acting as the 
means by which software components access basic software modules 
including the Operating System (OS) and communication service. As already 
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stated, the RTE make software components independent from the mapping 
to a speciﬁc ECU. 
2.1.3 BSW Layer 
The BSW Layer is divided into three sublayers [8], this approach allows for a 
better reuse of the more abstract parts of the description: 
1. The upper layer, the BswModuleDescription, contains the 
speciﬁcation of all the provided and required interfaces including the 
dependencies to other modules; 
2. The middle layer, the BswInternalBehavior, contains a model of some 
basic activity inside the module. This model deﬁnes the requirements 
of the module for the conﬁguration of the OS and the BSW Scheduler. 
Note that it is restricted only to the scheduling behavior here and 
does not describe the algorithmic behavior of the module; 
3. The bottom layer, the BswImplementation contains information on 
the individual code. 
2.2 AUTOSAR TOOL 
AUTOSAR tool refers to all tools that support the tasks of creation, 
modiﬁcation and interpretation of AUTOSAR models. In the development 
process of an AUTOSAR compliant system, many tools (coming from 
diﬀerent vendors) may be involved. The data exchanged between these 
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diﬀerent tools need to agree on a common understanding about the 
wording and the semantics. AUTOSAR formally deﬁnes the structure and 
semantics of data by means of Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) class 
diagrams. In addition, AUTOSAR has chosen eXtensible Markup Language 
(XML) as a language for exchange of data between diﬀerent AUTOSAR tools 
[9]. Therefore, an AUTOSAR system can be described in AUTOSAR XML 
(ARXML). 
2.3 AUTOSAR META-MODELS 
2.3.1 Software components 
Software Component (SWC) are one of the most important architectural 
elements of the AUTOSAR meta-model. They represent piece of software 
which provide speciﬁc functionalities and they provide and/or require 
interfaces and are connected to each other to fulﬁll architectural 
responsibilities. 
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Figure 3: AUTOSAR: SWC metamodel 
Figure 3 shows the meta-model for SWCs: 
• ApplicationSwComponentType and 
SensorActuatorSwComponentType represent, respectively, the 
application software and the software running on sensor/actuator 
(there are other types of SwComponentType which are not shown in 
ﬁgure, because they are not interesting for our purposes); 
• CompositionSwComponentType is used to aggregate two or more 
SwComponentPrototype (every one of which is typed by a 
SwComponentType). This can be useful to represents a system 
composed by two or more software components and to see how they 
are connected between each other; 
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• SwComponentPrototype represents an instance of a 
SwComponentType (ApplicationSwComponentType, 
SensorActuatorSwComponentType or other not shown in ﬁgure) 
within a CompositionSwComponentType. Every 
SwComponentPrototype is typed by one SwComponentType. 
2.3.2 Ports 
Software components can communicate between each other, only by 
means of their PortPrototype. Every port is typed by one interface. Two 
ports can be connected only if they are typed by the same interface. 
 
Figure 4: AUTOSAR: Port meta-model 
Figure 4 shows the meta-model for ports and their relations with software 
components: 
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• Every SwComponentType (ApplicationSwComponentType, 
SensorActuatorSwComponentType, etc.) can have 0 or more ports; 
• Ports can be: 
– PPortPrototype: a port which provides services or data; 
– RPortPrototype: a port which requires services or data; 
– PRPortPrototype: a port which can provides and requires 
services or data. 
• Every port can be typed by one and only one interface. 
2.3.3 Interfaces 
A PortInterface is used to speciﬁes what kind of information is exchanged 
between two PortPrototypes. PortInterface represents also a 
"compatibility" between two ports, because the communication between 
two ports is possible only if they have the same interface. In this section we 
focus on two kinds of interfaces: 
• sender-receiver interface; 
• client-server interface. 
2.3.3.1 Sender-Receiver interface 
Sender-receiver interface (SenderReceiverInterface in the AUTOSAR meta-
model) can be used for the speciﬁcation of the typically asynchronous 
communication pattern, where a sender provides data that are required by 
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one or more receivers. A PortPrototypes typed by a SenderReceiverInterface 
may be connected to establish a 1..n (i.e. one sender, multiple receivers) 
communication relationship. SenderReceiverInterface is also used to 
speciﬁes the data elements sent and received over the ports which are 
typed by that interface. 
The meta-model for SenderReceiverInterface is shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 5: AUTOSAR: Sender-Receiver Interface meta-model 
• PortInterface is the base class from which SenderReceiverInterface 
derives. The public attributes isService and serviceKind are used to 
specify if the interface is related to an AUTOSAR service or not (this 
aspect is better explained in section 3.3); 
• SenderReceiverInterface is the class used to specify that the 
communication is of type sender-receiver. This class contains one or 
more dataElement of type VariableDataPrototype, which represents 
the piece of information transmitted among PortPrototypes typed by 
a SenderReceiverInterface. 
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2.3.3.2 Client-server interface 
A client-server interface (ClientServerInterface in the AUTOSAR meta-
model) is used to deﬁne a client-server communication, where a client may 
initiate the execution of an operation by a server which supports that 
operation. The server executes the operation and, when completed, it 
provides the client with the result (synchronous operation call) or else the 
client checks for the completion of the operation by itself (asynchronous 
operation call). A client shall not be connected to multiple servers. 
The meta-model for ClientServerInterface is shown in Figure 6: 
• ClientServerInterface deﬁnes a collection of client-server operations 
(ClientServerOperation in ﬁgure); 
• ClientServerOperation consists of 0..* ArgumentDataPrototypes (the 
parameters for the operation). Every parameter has a direction, 
which can be: 
– in: the parameter is passed to the operation; 
– inout: the parameter is passed to, and returned from the 
operation; 
– out: the parameter is returned from the operation. 
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Figure 6: AUTOSAR: Client-Server Interface meta-model 
2.3.3.3 Internal Behavior 
Internal behavior (SwcInternalBehavior in the AUTOSAR meta-model) 
provides means for formally deﬁning the behavior of a software 
component. In other words, it describes the relevant aspects of the 
software-component with respect to the Runtime Environment (RTE), i.e. 
the runnable entities (which are the smallest code-fragments that are 
provided by a software component) and the RTE events they respond to. 
The meta-model for internal behavior is shown in Figure 7: 
• SwcInternalBehavior can contain one or more RunnableEntity; 
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Figure 7: AUTOSAR: Internal Behavior meta-model 
• implicitInterRunnableVariables and explicitInterRunnableVariables 
are variables which can be written and read by runnable entities 
belonging to the same software component; the diﬀerence between 
the two is that: 
– implicitInterRunnableVariable is used to avoid concurrent 
access to a variable, by creating copies of it (one for every 
runnable entity that want to access the variable); 
– explicitInterRunnableVariable is used to block potential 
concurrent accesses to a variable; it is used to get data 
consistency; 
• RTEEvents are used to trigger the execution of runnable entities; it is 
important to note (as stated in Section 2.2.4 of [6]) that all activities 
within an AUTOSAR application is initiated by the triggering of 
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runnable entities by the RTE as a result of RTE events. Relation 
between a runnable entity and an RTEEvent is speciﬁed by means of 
startOnEvent reference (as shown in ﬁgure); this means that when 
an RTEEvent occurs, it is the responsibility of the RTE to trigger the 
execution of the corresponding runnable entity.  
One of the most common RTE events is the TimingEvent: a periodic 
event whose period can be speciﬁed (in seconds) in the period 
attribute of the TimingEvent class. The complete list of events is 
written in section 4.2.2.4 of [6]. 
2.3.4 AUTOSAR Services 
AUTOSAR Services can be seen as a hybrid concept between Basic Software 
Modules and Software components. Software components that requires 
AUTOSAR services use standardized AUTOSAR interfaces to communicate 
with them. 
The dependency of a software component from an AUTOSAR service is 
modeled by adding provided or required ports (hereinafter referred to as 
’service ports’) to the software component. The interface for these ports 
needs to be one of the standardized service interfaces deﬁned in the 
AUTOSAR documentation, and the attribute isService of the interface must 
be set to true. Furthermore, the internal behavior of the software 
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component shall contain a SwcServiceDepencency, which is used to add 
more information about the required service. 
 
Figure 8: AUTOSAR: Service Dependency meta-model 
The meta-model of the SwcServiceDepencency is shown in Figure 8, a 
description for each element is the following: 
• SwcServiceDepencency is used to associate ports, port groups and (in 
special cases) data deﬁned for a software component to a given 
ServiceNeeds element; 
• ServiceNeeds are used to provide detailed information about what a 
software component expects from the AUTOSAR service. For 
instance, CryptoServiceNeeds can be used to specify a maximum 
length for the key used in cryptographic services; 
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• RoleBasedPortAssignment is used to specify an assignment of a role 
to a particular service port of a software component. With this 
assignment, the role of the service port can be mapped to a speciﬁc 
ServiceNeeds element. The attribute portPrototype of this class, is 
used to refer a service port of the software component. 
From ServiceNeeds can be derived other classes, shown in Figure 9, which 
will not been considered, as they are not useful for our purpose. 
 
Figure 9: AUTOSAR: ServiceNeeds meta-model 
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3 CYBER SECURITY: A USE CASE 
3.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The system which this work will analyze is the Front Light Manager (based 
on the system deﬁned in [2]). It’s in charge of managing the low beams 
feature of a car. All other light functionalities like parking orientation light, 
fog lights, etc. are excluded. A graphical description of the system is shown 
in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: Front Light Manager: System overview 
The general purpose of the low beams system is to illuminate the roadway 
in the dark. The low beams are turned on by the user through the Light 
Switch, if the Ignition Key is ON. System status (malfunctions included) shall 
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be reported to the driver through the Human Machine Interface (HMI in 
Figure 10). In case of low beams malfunctions the Onboard Computer shall 
signal the closest repair center to the driver. The functioning rules for the 
Front Light Management (FLM) are the following: 
1. Detection of a low beams request: 
 The FLM shall evaluate the Ignition Key position; 
 The FLM shall read the Light Switch position; 
2. Evaluate the low beams light request: 
 The FLM shall evaluate the Light Switch status; 
 The FLM shall create a switch event (ON) if the Light Switch 
status changes from OFF to ON; 
 The FLM shall create a switch event (OFF) if the Light Switch 
status changes from ON to OFF; 
3. Control the low beams lights: 
 The FLM shall activate the low beams light if the Ignition Key 
position is ON and a Light Switch event is detected; 
 The FLM shall deactivate the low beams light if the Ignition 
Key position is OFF, or a Light Switch event (OFF) is detected; 
4. Monitoring the low beams light functioning: 
 The FLM shall supervise the low beams lights; 
 The FLM shall report a malfunctioning of the low beams lights; 
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 The FLM shall display the low beams lights status to the user 
by means of the HMI; in case of low beams malfunctioning, 
FLM shall display the closest repair center through the On-
board Computer (OBC); 
5. Activation of the daytime running lights: 
 The FLM shall activate the daytime running lights in case of a 
low beams lights malfunctioning. 
A communication focused view of the technical interfacing is shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Front Light Management: communication focused view 
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
As starting point, the following assumptions are deﬁned: 
1. Implementation of Front Light Management software on one ECU; 
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2. Activation of light via switch which provides one output that is a 
digital I/O; 
3. Emergency light functionality is provided by hardware and not 
intended to use AUTOSAR software parts; 
4. All memory (volatile and non-volatile) is protected against reversible 
transient faults. It is assumed that mechanisms like ECC are available; 
5. Hardware means for memory partitioning are available; 
6. The analysis of failure modes of the micro-controller is performed 
and safety measures are deﬁned and implemented; 
7. Physical cyber-attacks are not taken into account, as they are a 
special case and they have to be treated in diﬀerent ways. 
Additionally, subsequent constraints are deﬁned: 
1. Assuming that the ECU is working as required: 
1.1. The ECU is waking up; running and going to sleep correctly; 
1.2. The necessary communication network is available, up and running 
correctly; 
1.3. The necessary Basic Software Modules are triggered as required. 
2. Failures in the board wiring system, battery or power supply are not 
considered. Even though the battery is external to the FLM, its failures 
will directly aﬀect the FLM and any other vehicle’s electronics systems; 
3. A startup test of the bulbs is assumed to be in place; 
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4. The light switch signal is already ﬁltered/de-bounced. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the signal is provided in an adequate quality to match 
requirements of ISO 2626.  
3.3 WARNING AND DEGRADATION CONCEPT 
For the low beams lights the following 2-step degradation concept shall be 
implemented: 
Normal Mode: 
• The system work as described in 3.1. 
Degraded Mode Step 1 - loss of one low beams: 
• The second low beams still fulﬁlls its function; 
• A warning shall be provided to the driver (by means of HMI), 
indicating partial loss of low beams, while low beams is requested 
but not successfully activated (fault detected); 
• The Onboard Computer shall provide the closest repair center. 
Degraded Mode Step 2 - loss of both low beams4: 
                                                   
4 Additional driver assistance functions could be activated in this mode to assist the driver, but this 
is not part of this example. 
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• Day time running lights shall be activated, whenever low beams is 
requested but not successfully activated (fault detected)5; 
• A warning shall be provided to the driver (by means of HMI), 
indicating loss of low beams and activation of daytime running lights, 
while low beams is requested. 
• The OBC shall provide the closest repair center. 
3.4 SYSTEM MODELING 
3.4.1 Modeling Tool 
The tool used to model the system is IBM Rational Rhapsody Developer. It’s 
a visual development environment for embedded, real time or technical 
application software development based on the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML). It helps to improve productivity throughout the embedded software 
development lifecycle—from requirements capture to implementation, test 
and deployment. In our purpose I used it to model the system, starting from 
requirements and system’s description. The tool is used also within the 
project SAFURE6 [5] and by Magneti Marelli7 [10]. 
                                                   
5 This kind of usage of day time running light as fallback is just used as an example to demonstrate 
a degraded function. 
6  SAFURE (Safety And Security By Design For Interconnected Mixed-Critical Cyber-Physical 
Systems): the project targets the design of cyber-physical systems by implementing a methodology 
that ensures safety and security "by construction". 
7 Magneti Marelli is an international Group committed to the design and production of hi-tech 
systems and components for the automotive sector 
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3.4.2 System’s Components Definition 
The system can be modeled using the following Software Components 
(SWC): 
• Sensor SWC (Light Switch); 
• Sensor SWC (Ignition Key); 
• Application SWC (Light Request); 
• Application SWC (Front Light Management, FLM); 
• Actuator SWC (Headlights); 
• Application SWC (HMI); 
• Application SWC (Onboard Computer). 
Figure 12 shows the interactions between components. Communication 
ﬂow between components is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 12: Front Light Management: system Software Components overview 
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Figure 13: Front Light Management: sequence diagram 
3.4.3 Software Components Behavior 
• Light Switch: it waits for an incoming request from Light Request and 
provide the switch status as a response; 
• Ignition Key: it waits for an incoming request from Light Request and 
provide the Ignition Key status; 
• Light Request: it waits for an incoming request from Front Light 
Management and asks Light Switch and Ignition Key for their status, 
it waits for their reply and it provides this information to the Front 
Light Management. 
• Front Light Management: 
1. it asks to the Light Request for Light Switch and Ignition Key 
status; 
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2. it processes the status information obtained in the previous step 
and reacts by activating/deactivating the low beams using the 
Headlights actuator; 
3. it sends a notiﬁcation the HMI. 
If one or both low beams lights fails, a notiﬁcation is sent to the HMI 
and to On Board Computer. In addition, if both low beams fail, Front 
Light Management sends to the Headlights actuator the command to 
activate the daytime running lights. 
• Headlights: it applies the commands received from the Front Light 
Management. 
• HMI: it shows the low beams status to the user (e.g. green light if low 
beams are ON and working, red light in case of low beams 
malfunction). 
• OBC: in case of malfunction of one or both the low beams, On Board 
Computer shows the closest repair center location to the user. 
3.4.4 ECU Mapping 
The system shall be mapped as shown in Figure 14. The Front Light 
Management and Light Request elements shall reside on the same ECU. The 
technical interfacing of system elements with Front Light Management ECU 
is assumed as shown in Table 1. 
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Figure 14: Front Light Manager: Components ECU mapping 
System Element Interface of FLM ECU 
Light Switch Position DIO 
Ignition Key Position CAN Interface 
Headlight PWM 
HMI CAN Interface 
On-Board Computer CAN Interface 
Table 1: Interfaces of FLM ECU 
3.4.5 Communication failure handling 
The AUTOSAR standard provides a mechanism to detect and handle, at 
runtime, communication failures within a communication link. The provided 
mechanism is the End-to-End (E2E) protection [11]. The AUTOSAR E2E 
protection can be used to protect data element within a sender-receiver 
communication. It is not applicable to client-server communication 
paradigm. By applying the E2E protection, basically the sender adds 
protection information (such as CRC, sequence counter) to the data and the 
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receiver evaluates the received message and indicates the result to the 
application. The E2E protection has the following characteristics: 
1. it protects the safety-related data elements to be sent over the RTE 
by attaching control data; 
2. it veriﬁes the safety-related data elements received from the RTE 
using this control data; 
3. it indicates that received safety-related data elements faulty, which 
then has to be handled by the receiver Software Components. 
Regardless where E2E is executed, the E2E Protection is for data elements. 
A data element is either completely E2E-protected, or it is not protected. It 
is not possible to protect a part of it. An appropriate usage of the E2E Library 
alone is not suﬃcient to achieve a safe E2E communication according to ASIL 
D (the highest ASIL value) requirements. Solely the user is responsible to 
demonstrate that the selected proﬁle provides suﬃcient error detection 
capabilities for the considered network.  
E2E communication protection aims to detect and mitigate the causes for 
or eﬀects of communication faults arising from: 
1. (systematic) software faults; 
2. (random) hardware faults; 
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3. transient faults due to external inﬂuences (repetition of information, 
loss or delay of information, masquerading, corruption of 
information and so on). 
3.4.6 IBM Rational Rhapsody Model 
Software Components have been implemented using Application SW 
Component (FLM and Light Request) and Sensor-Actuator SW Component 
(HMI, OBC, Headlight, IgnitionKey and LightSwitch). 
All the interfaces defined are Sender-Receiver, as components need to 
exchange data. In order to do that, communicating ports must have the 
same interfaces. 
At Software Component level, all the components are interconnected using 
a Virtual Functional Bus (VfB), which acts as a communications matrix 
connecting I/O units and Software Components.  
The model obtained by modeling the use case using IBM Rational Rhapsody 
is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Front Light Manager: model from IBM Rational Rhapsody 
 
3.4.7 Security problem 
Looking at the model presented in the previous section, it is clear that no 
security is modeled (or requested). At Software Component level there is no 
easy way to request security services. 
Security nowadays is a fundamental problem when designing a service. 
Networks inside cars may be victims of cyber-attacks, like classical computer 
networks. Before defining which security services are needed, it’s important 
to define which cyber-attacks threaten the use case. 
In the next section an analysis of the possible threats will be done, which is 
the starting point to provide a solution to this security lack. 
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3.5 SAFETY AND SECURITY CONCEPTS 
The following subsection outlines the safety analysis on vehicle level and its 
result typically created by the OEM and partially provided to a supplier. 
3.5.1 Hazard Analysis and Risks Assessment 
Hazard H1: Total loss of low beams (ASIL B). 
This hazard potentially could cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle, 
leave the road and collide with environmental parts. 
Exceptions and Boundary Conditions to H1: 
• The loss of low beams is only to be seen as a risk in case of bad 
viewing conditions (night, fog, etc.). 
• The loss of low beams on a curvy, unlighted rural road is evaluated 
as a most critical situation. 
• The loss of only one low beams is not considered to be directly 
leading to a hazardous situation. However, it is a latent fault and will 
be included in the concept advisement. 
ASIL: The ASIL B rating is based on the severity rate the exposure rate and 
the controllability identiﬁed during hazard analysis and risk assessment. 
Safety Goal SG01: Prevent total loss of low beams 
Safe State: Low beams activated 
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Hazard H2: Lose control of the system due to an external intrusion in the 
system (ASIL B). 
An intruder who takes control of the system can potentially alter the low 
beams status and simulate a low beams malfunction. These situations could 
cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle or force the driver to stop in 
one speciﬁc repair center. 
Exceptions and Boundary Conditions to H2: 
• In case of low beams malfunction (real or caused by an external 
entity), the driver not necessarily stop to closest repair center. 
• A low beams malfunction, if it happens during night, may force the 
driver to stop in a dangerous area. 
Others exceptions and boundary conditions expressed for H1 applies also to 
H2. 
Security Goal SG02: Prevent an external (not authorized) entity to access to 
the system. 
Secure State: An external (not authorized) entity is not able to access and 
take control of the system. 
Note: Additional hazards could be assumed. However, to limit our example, 
H1 and H2 are assumed to be the relevant hazards. 
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3.5.2 Relevant Failure Modes 
The safety goal SG01 can be violated through one or more of the following 
malfunctions (MF): 
• MF01: Failure of the detection of the turn-on/ turn-oﬀ conditions of 
lights; 
• MF02: Failure of the evaluation and implementation of the light 
request function which is used to turn lights on; 
• MF03: Failure of the activated lights. 
The security goal SG02 can be violated through one or more of the following 
malfunctions: 
• MF04: Malicious injection of fake messages over the CAN8 bus; 
• MF05: Malicious injection of code into FLM ECU, HMI or OBC. 
3.5.3 Functional Safety and Security Requirements 
3.5.3.1 FunSafReq01  
FLM shall detect any valid turn on condition of low beams correctly. (ASIL B) 
Relates to MF01: Low beams are not activated after a “valid LB lights ON” 
request. 
                                                   
8 A Controller Area Network (CAN bus): a vehicle bus standard designed to allow microcontrollers 
and devices to communicate with each other in applications without a host computer. It is a 
message-based protocol, designed originally for multiplex electrical wiring within automobiles, but 
is also used in many other contexts. 
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3.5.3.2 FunSafReq02  
FLM shall verify the validity for any low beams lights request received and 
activate or deactivate the low beams accordingly. (ASIL B) Relates to MF02: 
Switching lights oﬀ without receiving a “valid LB lights OFF” request. 
3.5.3.3 FunSafReq03 
FLM shall detect failures of the activated low beams and signal malfunctions 
to the driver. (ASIL B) Relates to MF03: Failure of the activated lights. 
3.5.3.4 FunSecReq01 
FLM shall verify the authenticity of received CAN messages. Relates to 
MF04. 
3.5.3.5 FunSecReq02 
The ECU’s software shall be developed according to software development 
standards like MISRA C [12] and CERT [13]. Relates to MF05. 
3.5.4 Technical Safety Requirements 
3.5.4.1.1 SysSafReq01 
The CAN connected Body Controller shall signal Ignition Key clamp 15 (CL15) 
status via CAN bus message. 
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3.5.4.1.2 SysSafReq02 
The light switch shall signal the state of the switch via digital HW line. 
HW_LB_OFF (0=0V if lights on are requested, 1=5V if lights oﬀ are 
requested). (ASIL B) 
3.5.4.1.3 SysSafReq03 
Failures within the light switch shall lead to the digital HW line. HW_LB_OFF 
set to 0. (ASIL B) 
3.5.4.1.4 SysSafReq04 
FLM ECU shall ensure that the limits (like voltage and PWM) to power the 
LB bulbs are kept, while FLM ECU detects that the condition for powering 
the bulbs is fulﬁlled (as deﬁned as part of nominal function). (ASIL B) 
3.5.4.1.5 SysSafReq05 
While CL15ON==1, FLM ECU shall switch the light oﬀ only if HW_LB_OFF ==1 
condition is true continuously for 20ms 9  (CAN message: CL15_01; CAN 
signal: CL15ON Boolean, ‘1’ if clamp 15 is set to on, ‘0’ if clamp 15 is set to 
oﬀ). (ASIL B):  
                                                   
9 The timing condition to wait for a stable condition for some milliseconds is included to debounce 
the signal value. The particular value of 20ms is taken as experts’ experience. Another value could 
be used instead, as well. 
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3.5.4.1.6 SysSafReq06 
FLM ECU shall detect circuit failures (bulbs, fuses, wiring-oc/sc) and signal 
them via CAN. (ASIL B) 
3.5.4.1.7 SysSafReq07 
FLM ECU shall activate both daytime running lights (DRL) if a failure of both 
LB bulbs is detected continuously for 200ms. (ASIL B) Note: The FTT budget 
is allocated the following way: 200ms failure detection time + conservative 
200ms time interval until halogen bulb reaches full intensity (failure 
reaction) + 100ms buﬀer = 500ms. 
3.5.4.1.8 SysSafReq08 
FLM ECU shall use independent circuits to power left and right bulbs such 
that no single fault can cause a total loss of low beams. (ASIL B) 
3.5.4.1.9 SysSafReq09 
HMI shall display bulb outage information according to the signal LBFailure 
received via CAN. (ASIL A) 
3.5.4.1.10 SysSafReq10 
The data transmission via CAN between sender and receiver must be 
ensured for CAN message: CL15_01 CAN signal: CL15ON Boolean, (‘1’ if 
clamp 15 is set to on, ‘0’ if clamp 15 is set to oﬀ). (ASIL B) 
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3.5.4.1.11 SysSafReq11 
The data transmission via CAN between sender and receiver must be 
ensured for CAN message: LightStatus_01, CAN signal: LBFailure. (ASIL A) 
3.5.4.1.12 SysSafReq12 
FLM ECU shall activate low beams lights if a communication fault regarding 
message CL15_01 is detected continuously for 200ms. Note: The FTT budget 
is allocated the following way: 200ms failure detection time + conservative 
200ms time interval until halogen bulb reaches full intensity (failure 
reaction) + 100ms buﬀer = 500ms. 
3.5.4.1.13 SysSafReq13 
OBC shall display the closest repair center to the driver, according to the 
signal LBFailure received via CAN. (ASIL A) 
3.5.4.1.14 SysSafReq14 
FLM ECU shall: activate both daytime running lights (DRL) if a 
communication fault regarding message LightStatus_01 is detected 
continuously for 200ms; provide a text message to the driver like “Light 
system defect”. 
Section 3: Cyber Security: a use case 
43 
 
3.5.4.2 Relation between security and safety requirements 
This section shows how the non-compliance with the functional security 
requirements described in section 4.3 aﬀects the technical safety 
requirements. In particular: 
• if the FunSecReq01 is not satisﬁed, fake/replicated messages can 
pass over the CAN bus; 
• if the FunSecReq02 is not satisﬁed, system’s components can be 
compromised by an external entity. 
Technical safety requirements are aﬀected by the non-compliance with the 
functional security requirements according to the following statements: 
• SysSafReq01: if FunSecReq01 is not respected, the CL15 status can 
be altered by an external entity and thus not reﬂect the real status of 
the ignition key; 
• SysSafReq06: if FunSecReq02 is not respected, the FLM ECU can be 
compromised by an external entity and then it can signal fake circuit 
failures via CAN bus; 
• SysSafReq09: if FunSecReq01 is not respected, LBFailure message 
can be altered by an external entity and cause the HMI to display fake 
bulb outage information; if FunSecReq02 is not respected, FLM ECU 
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can be compromised by an external entity and then inject fake 
messages via CAN bus; 
• SysSafReq10: if FunSecReq01 is not respected, the CAN message 
CL15_01 can be altered by an external entity; 
• SysSafReq11: if FunSecReq01 is not respected, the CAN message 
LightStatus_01 can be altered by an external entity; 
• SysSafReq13: if FunSecReq01 is not respected, the OBC may receive 
an altered LBFailure message; if FunSecReq02 is not respected, the 
FLM ECU can be compromised by an external entity and it can send 
fake messages to the OBC. 
Table 2 summarizes what has been speciﬁed before. 
 FunSecReq01 FunSecReq02 
SysSafReq01 X  
SysSafReq06  X 
SysSafReq09 X X 
SysSafReq10 X  
SysSafReq11 X  
SysSafReq13 X X 
Table 2: Inﬂuence of functional security requirements on technical safety requirements 
 
Section 3: Cyber Security: a use case 
45 
 
3.6 USE CASE BASED THREAT MODELING 
3.6.1 Tool used 
In order to determine which threats may afflict the use case described in 
the previous section, it has been used the Microsoft SDL Threat Modeling 
Tool [14]. The tool helps developers in finding threats in the design phase 
of software projects. A threat model is representation of the software or 
device components in a system, the data flows between them and the trust 
boundaries in the system. When threat-modeling, potential design 
vulnerabilities can be discovered by analyzing the system’s security 
properties and identifying potential threats to the information assets in the 
system.  
Unlike pure verification techniques, such as penetration testing or fuzzing, 
threat-modeling can be performed before a product or service has been 
implemented; this helps ensure that a product or service is as much as 
possible secure by design. 
The SDL threat-modeling approach starts with a data flow diagram. From 
the diagram, potential threats are identified. For each threat, mitigations 
are proposed. In some cases, the mitigation takes the form of changing the 
design itself, in which case the new or changed elements must be analysed 
in an additional iteration. When the mitigations have been implemented, 
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the product or service is validated against the threat model to ensure that 
the mitigations work and that design functionality and performance are 
sufficient. If the design has serious security issues, revisiting the design and 
the threat model may be appropriate. 
3.6.2 Threat Model 
The Microsoft SDL Threat Modeling Tool applies a particular threat-
modeling approach called STRIDE. It’s an acronym for the threat types of 
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of 
service, and Elevation of privilege. STRIDE is a way to find a wide variety of 
threats using these easy-to-remember threat types. Not all threats fit easily 
into a STRIDE category and some threats may fit into more than one 
category. More important than fitting a threat to a category is using the 
model to help you describe the threat and design an effective mitigation. 
With its matching of threats to mitigating features, STRIDE is also 
convenient way of moving the focus from threat to mitigation. Each threat 
is matched to the feature or property that should be present in the software 
to mitigate the threat, shown in Table 3. 
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Threat Property Threat Definition 
Spoofing Authentication Spoofing threats involve and 
adversary creating and exploiting 
confusion about who is talking to 
whom. Spoofing threats apply to 
the entity being fooled, not the 
entity being impersonated. Thus, 
external elements are subject to a 
spoofing threat when they are 
confused about what or whom they 
are talking to. 
Tampering  Integrity Tampering threats involve an 
adversary modifying data, usually 
as it flows across a network, resides 
in memory, on disk, or in databases. 
Repudiation Non-Repudiation Repudiation threats involve an 
adversary denying that something 
happened 
Information 
Disclosure 
Confidentiality Exposing information to someone 
not authorized to see it. 
Denial of Service Availability  Deny or degrade service to users. 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Authorization Gain capabilities without proper 
authorization 
Table 3: STRIDE Definitions 
3.6.3 Threat Model for Front Light Manager use case 
The Front Light Manager use case has been modeled using the Threat 
Modeling Tool in the way showed in Figure 16. 
The opacity represents components and connections which are out of the 
scope, as the analysis has been done only for communication over CAN bus.  
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The step after the use case modeling, is the analysis of the threats affecting 
the model. The tool did a risk analysis to apply the STRIDE threat model to 
the use case. The Threat Modeling Tool is intended for computer networks, 
so it has to be adapted by the user to the use case, as many threats found 
are not applicable to the CAN bus. A total of 38 threats have been found, 7 
of which are not applicable to the use case, 5 has been mitigated, leaving us 
with 26 remaining threats, which have to be considered to evaluate possible 
attacks. 
 
Figure 16: Front Light Manager: Model from Threat Modeling Tool 
3.6.4 Attack tree 
An attack tree is a conceptual diagrams showing how an asset, or target, 
might be attacked. The root of an attack tree (Level 0) is an abstract “attack 
goal” that is associated with a benefit to the attacker of some kind. Its child 
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nodes (Level 1) represent different “attack objectives” that could satisfy this 
attack goal. The attack objectives have a negative impact on the 
stakeholders. Thus, the severity of the outcome can be estimated at this 
level. The attack objectives may be further decomposed into a number of 
“attack methods” that could be employed to achieve the attack objective. 
Each attack method will in turn be based on a logical combination (AND/OR) 
of attacks against one or more “assets” populating the lowest levels of the 
attack tree. These are described here as “asset attacks”, and are the 
terminal nodes of the tree. The tree is truncated where the probability of 
success can be estimated for asset attacks. These individual probabilities 
can subsequently be combined using the tree logic to assess the overall 
probability for each of the attack methods. 
A generic structure of an attack tree is the one shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Generic structure of an attack tree 
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The threats found in the previous section have been used to model an 
Attack Tree applicable to the use case. The root of the tree, in this case, is 
an abstraction of Hazard H2, defined in section 3.5.1. Two attack objectives 
have been defined in Level 1, both can possibly lead to the root: the 
corruption of on-board signals and a forced turn-off of the low beams. The 
attack methods to reach these attack objectives can be found in Level 2, the 
AND node shows how both attack methods “Corrupt HMI” and “Corrupt 
OBC” are needed to reach the upper level of the three. Leaf nodes have 
simple Asset Attacks.  
The tree is shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Front Light Manager: attack tree 
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3.7 RISK ANALYSIS 
Since now, the security requirements analysis process used in this work, 
involved the identification of security requirements (Section 3.5) and the 
identification of threats (Section 3.6). 
In this section it will be performed a risk analysis over the attack tree 
obtained previously. The objective of the analysis is to identify the most 
relevant security requirements, to do so we first need to assess the level of 
risk posed by potential attacks and to prioritize the identified security 
requirements based on the results of the risk assessment. 
There are a number of risk assessment rating and processing methods 
currently in use. With these methods (and methodologies), it’s possible to 
determine the risk assessment rating (or ranking) of the use case. In this 
work, the model chosen is EVITA (E-safety Vehicle Intrusion Protected 
Applications). Within this project, a model for performing risk analysis was 
proposed to assess not only the risk associated with an attack but also the 
severity of the possible outcome for stakeholders, and the probability that 
such an attack can be successfully done [15]. 
The following subsection will explain the risk assessment and rating, using 
the EVITA model. 
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3.7.1 Severity Classes 
To perform a threats and risks analysis, the EVITA standard will be 
considered. First of all, it’s important to asses which factors are important 
during the analysis phase. The starting point or this classification scheme is 
the safety severity classification of ISO/DIS 26262, which is based on the 
Abbreviated Injury Scale [16]. For the purposes of this analysis, this has been 
adapted and augmented to consider both the greater numbers of vehicles 
that may be involved and implications for aspects other than safety, 
including:  
• Privacy: identification and tracking of vehicles or individuals;  
• Financial: financial losses that may be experienced by individuals or 
ITS operators;  
• Operational: interference with vehicle systems and functions that do 
not impact on functional safety.  
To accommodate this more complex situation the classification proposed 
here (see Table 4) separates and categorizes different aspects of the 
consequences of possible security breaches. 
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Table 4: Severity Classes 
3.7.2 Attack Potential 
The attack potential is a measure of the minimum effort to be expended in 
an attack to be successful. Essentially, the attack potential for an attack 
corresponds to the effort required creating and carrying out the attack. The 
higher the attackers’ motivation, the higher efforts they may be willing to 
exert. There are multiple methods of representing and quantifying the 
influencing factors. The following factors should be considered during 
analysis of the attack potential [17]:  
1. Elapsed Time: This is the total amount of time taken by an attacker 
to identify that a particular potential vulnerability may exist, to 
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develop an attack method and to sustain effort required mounting 
the attack.  
2. Specialist Expertise: This refers to the required level of general 
knowledge of the underlying principles, product types or attack 
methods.  
3. Knowledge of the system under investigation: This refers to specific 
expertise in relation to the system under investigation. Though it is 
related to general expertise, it is distinct from that.  
4. Window of opportunity: This has a relationship to the Elapsed Time 
factor. Identification and exploitation of a vulnerability may require 
considerable amounts of access to a system that may increase the 
likelihood of detection of the attack. Some attack methods may 
require considerable effort off-line, and only brief access to the 
target to exploit. Access may also need to be continuous or over a 
number of sessions.  
5. IT hardware/software or other equipment: This refers to the 
equipment required to identify and exploit vulnerability.  
To determine for each path in an attack tree the attack potential required 
to identify and exploit it, sum up the appropriate values from Table 6 and 
apply Table 5 to classify the attack potential. 
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Table 5: Attack Potential 
In this context the term “attack potential” is really describing the difficulty 
of mounting a successful attack, while for risk analysis purposes a 
probability measure is required. A high probability of successful attack is 
assumed to correspond to the “basic” attack potential, since many possible 
attackers will have the necessary attack potential. Conversely, a “high” 
attack potential suggests a lower probability of successful attacks, since the 
number of attackers with the necessary attack potential is expected to be 
comparatively small. Consequently, Table 5 also proposes an associated 
numerical scale that reflects the relative probability of success associated 
with the attack potential in a more intuitive manner. The “attack 
probability” measure (P) is higher for easier attacks that are associated with 
lower attack potentials, and lower for more difficult attacks associated with 
the higher attack potentials. 
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Table 6: Rating aspect of attack potential 
3.7.3 Controllability 
Where the severity vector includes a non-zero safety component, the risk 
assessment may include an additional probability parameter that 
represents the potential for the driver to influence the severity of the 
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outcome. In the MISRA Safety Analysis Guidelines [17] and ISO/DIS 26262 
[18] this possibility is reflected in a qualitative measure referred to as 
“controllability” (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Controllability 
3.7.4 Estimating Risk 
Before estimating the risk for the hazard which has been used as root for 
the attack tree, we need a last information, which is the Combined Attack 
Potential. 
In the tree, children may be connected to their parent with an AND or and 
OR connection. The AND is explicitly specified through a circle, otherwise an 
OR occurs implicitly. 
The attack potential for OR and AND connections are: 
𝐴𝑂𝑅(𝑃𝑖) = max⁡{𝑃𝑖} 
𝐴𝐴𝑁𝐷(𝑃𝑖) = min⁡{𝑃𝑖} 
The risk level (R, a vector) is determined from the severity (S) associated 
with the attack objective and the combined attack potential (A) associated 
Section 3: Cyber Security: a use case 
58 
 
with a particular attack method. This is achieved by mapping the severity 
and attack potential to the risk using a “risk graph” approach. For severity 
aspects that are not safety related the risk graph maps two parameters 
(attack potential and severity) to a qualitative risk level. Combinations of 
severity and combined attack potential are mapped to a range of “security 
risk levels” (denoted Ri, where “i” is an integer) in Table 8 for non-safety 
security threats. The security risk level attributed to an attack increases with 
increasing severity and/or attack potential (the latter corresponding to 
lower attack potential).  
 
Table 8: Security Risk Level 
In order to include the additional parameter (controllability) in the 
assessment of safety-related security risks it is necessary to use of a 
different risk graph as proposed in Table 9, which maps three parameters 
(severity, attack probability, and controllability) to qualitative risk levels. 
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Table 9: Risk Level with Controllability information 
The class “R7+” that is used in Table 9 denotes levels of risk that are unlikely 
to be considered acceptable, such as safety hazards with the highest 
severity classes and threat levels, coupled with very low levels of 
controllability. 
3.7.5 Applying the risk analysis to FLM use case 
The steps for applying the risk level to the attack objectives are the 
following: 
1. The starting point for the risk analysis is the root of the tree. The very 
first step is to assign the Severity Classes and Controllability to the 
root. In this case the values chosen are: 
• C = 2 
• S = [3, 0, 0, 2] 
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2. The next step is to move to the leaves, where, for each leaf, the 
attack potential has to be assigned; 
After all the leaves have the attack potential assigned, the attack potential 
for each leaf’s parent has to be computed, following the formulas for 
AND/OR connections; 
3. Following the same reasoning, the attack potential for all the nodes 
has to be computed; 
4. When the attack’s objectives have been reached, the risk level is 
assigned following Table 8 or Table 9. 
After all the computation have been done, the tree obtained is the one 
shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Attack tree after risk levels are computed 
 
It is possible to assess, by analysing the attack tree presented previously, 
that the problem related to cyber security lies in the communications 
flowing on the CAN bus. This result will be useful to identify which part of 
the system must be enhanced.  
Next sections will present the classical method for introducing security in 
AUTOSAR during the modelling phase. Then an automatic process for 
avoiding errors during such phase will be presented. 
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4 SECURITY ANNOTATIONS AND SOFTWARE COMPONENT 
EXTENSIONS 
As previous sections highlighted, security is a priority to ensure that no 
inconvenient occurs, which may harm the driver (and the car itself). The 
solution to the lack of security is to ensure Confidentiality and Integrity to 
system’s communications, in particular to those occurring over the CAN Bus. 
4.1 AUTOSAR SECURITY MECHANISMS 
Starting with AUTOSAR 4.0, cryptographic requirements were introduced in 
order to support increasing automotive market demands in that field. In 
order to implement the cryptographic requirements, AUTOSAR defines two 
different specification documents: 
• Crypto Abstraction Library (CAL) [19]; 
• Crypto Service Manager (CSM) [20]. 
4.1.1 Crypto Abstraction Library 
The AUTOSAR library CAL provides other BSW modules and application 
SWCs with cryptographic services. It offers C functions that can be called 
from source code, i.e. from BSW modules, from SWC or from Complex 
Drivers. As the CAL is a library, it is not related to a special layer of the 
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AUTOSAR Layered Software Architecture. The services of the CAL are always 
executed in the context of the calling function. 
4.1.2 Crypto Service Manager 
The CSM is located in the Services Layer of AUTOSAR layered architecture, 
as shown in Figure 20. It offers standardized access to cryptographic services 
for applications via the port mechanism.  
Cryptographic services are, e.g., the computation of hashes, the verification 
of asymmetrical signatures, or the symmetrical encryption of data. These 
services depend on underlying cryptographic primitives and cryptographic 
schemes (CRY).  
CSM services use cryptographic algorithms that are implemented using a 
software library or cryptographic hardware modules.  
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Figure 20: AUTOSAR: Crypto Service Manager 
The CSM services are generic. Consequently, the CSM allows different 
applications to use the same service for different algorithms. While the 
definition of the services, offered by the CSM, is part of the CSM 
specification document, there is no specification in regards of the 
cryptographic service primitives contained. It is up to a provider to specify, 
implement and provide such for access by a CSM implementation. 
Many CSM/CPL interfaces use the same cryptographic building blocks. Thus, 
cryptographic building blocks should be implemented as separate modules 
and be called from the CSM/CPL interfaces. This implies that the code for 
cryptographic building blocks should not be implemented more than once. 
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4.1.2.1 Locality of the CSM 
Due to the fact that the CSM is an element of the AUTOSAR Services Layer, 
the offered service can be used locally only – it is not possible to access the 
service of the CSM directly via the VFB from a different ECU.  
If this is needed, it is up to a provider to specify, implement and provide 
some proxy for access of a CSM implementation, utilizing AUTOSAR 
communication services for instance. In this case, it must be taken into 
account that this raises security implications: any communication between 
ECUs is done via not protected (somehow open accessible) communication 
busses (e.g. CAN). This means, that unencrypted date, not yet signed data 
or key material would be transmitted and might become stolen or 
manipulated. 
4.1.3 CSM and CAL 
The AUTOSAR CSM and CAL specifications define the same cryptographic 
functionality. This provided functionality covers the following areas:  
 Hash calculation; 
 Generation and verification of message authentication codes;  
 Random number generation; 
 Encryption and decryption using symmetrical algorithms;  
 Encryption and decryption using asymmetrical algorithms; 
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 Generation and verification of digital signature; 
 Key management operations; 
As already stated, the AUTOSAR CSM and CAL specifications do not define 
the cryptographic algorithms to be used in order to implement the required 
functionality. It is up to the implementer to decide regarding based on his 
assumptions or (better) based on customer requirements that are not 
provided by AUTOSAR.  
The existence of two BSW modules (a service module and a library), 
providing the same (or similar) functionality, is for historical reasons: the 
cryptographic library has been introduced for using cryptographic 
functionality directly by bypassing the RTE, after the CSM has been defined 
already. Even if both modules provide mostly the same functionality, both 
use different mechanisms for communication. 
4.2 USING THE CSM TO PROVIDE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITIES 
As stated before, the CSM offers several security mechanisms. This section 
will show how to include those functionalities in an AUTOSAR (release 4.2.2) 
project. The FLM use case will be taken as example. 
The manual procedure to include security is simplified in the following steps: 
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 Building new interfaces, as shown in Figure 21. The name of such 
interfaces, as for their operations, is fixed and specified in the 
AUTOSAR Standard regarding the CSM [20]. Such interfaces must 
have the tag isService set to true and, optionally, the tag serviceKind 
can be set to cryptoServiceManager. An interface must be added for 
each service required by the CSM, in Figure 21 the interfaces added 
ask for integrity (CsmMacGenerate and CsmMacVerify) and 
confidentiality (CsmSymBlockEncrypt and CsmSymBlockDecrypt); 
 
Figure 21: IBM rational Rhapsody: Interfaces for the CSM. 
 Inside the internal behaviour of a software component requiring a 
service, a SwcServiceDependency element must be included. Inside 
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such element, it’s required to specify the client port(s) 
(assignedPort), through which requiring the chosen CSM service and 
the type of service (ServiceNeeds, specified in section 7.11 of [7]) 
required, in this case a CryptoServiceNeeds. This procedure is shown 
in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: IBM Rational Rhapsody: SWC Internal Behaviour specification for CSM services. 
The procedure specified before has to be done for each SWC and CSM 
service required. It’s clear that is a complex and error prone procedure. For 
this reason, this work presents a tool for security modeling and automatic 
code generation in AUTOSAR.  
4.3 SECURITY MODELING AND AUTOMATIC CODE GENERATION IN 
AUTOSAR 
The tool produced has the aim to simplify the procedure described in the 
previous section, to include security in AUTOSAR. It uses the ARXML file 
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generated from the model to analyse the model and look for ad-hoc 
elements inserted in the desc tag of data ports. Those elements are the 
following: 
 NONE: no security required; 
 AUTH: authentication required, CsmSymEncrypt and CsmSymDecrypt 
must be required to the CSM; 
 INTEGR: integrity required, CsmMacGenerate and CsmMacVerify 
must be required to the CSM; 
 BOTH: both authentication and integrity are required. 
In addition, the user can specify, after the security specification above, the 
will of adding a brand new component (Filter) or to include security directly 
inside the original component. The possible uses of the desc field is 
summarized below: 
 SecurityNeeds={INTEG,CONF,BOTH}; 
 NewComponent={TRUE,FALSE}. 
4.4 APPLICATION TO THE FRONT LIGHT MANAGER USE CASE 
In this section it is provided the application of the tool described in the 
previous sections to the Front Light Manager use case scenario. 
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The very first step is to identify which connections require security and 
which kind of security they require. 
 The connection between IgnitionKey and LightRequest requires 
confidentiality; 
 The connection between FLM and HMI requires integrity; 
 The connection between FLM and OBC requires integrity. 
After adding the security tags to the AUTOSAR model and producing the 
ARXML file, the latter is parsed by the python tool. It produces a new ARXML 
file as output. The file obtained can be loaded into IBM Rational Rhapsody 
to see graphically the result, which can be seen in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23: FLM model after python tool parsing 
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5 CRYPTO SERVICE MANAGER IMPLEMENTATION 
This section will present an implementation of the CSM in C-language, 
according with the AUTOSAR standard documentation. The modules 
implemented are the symmetrical encryption/decryption, symmetrical 
block encryption/decryption and the MAC generation/verification. The 
following sections will present how they are designed and implemented. In 
the following, the keyword <Service> will be used in place of 
SymBlockEncrypt, SymBlockDecrypt, SymEncrypt, SymDecrypt, MacGenerate 
and MacVerify. 
5.1 GENERAL BEHAVIOR 
The CSM supports processing of a single instance of each service at a time. 
The implementation of those CSM services which expect arbitrary amounts 
of user data (i.e. hashing, encryption, etc.) shall be based on the streaming 
approach with start, update and finish functions. This is the case of the 
implementation proposed. 
5.2 CONFIGURATION 
Each service configuration is realized as a constant structure of type 
Csm_<Service>ConfigType, and have a name which can be configured. 
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It is possible to configure synchronous and asynchronous job processing. In 
this work the synchronous one has been chosen, so the interface functions 
immediately compute the result. 
5.3 SYNCHRONISATION BETWEEN APPLICATION AND CSM MODULE 
CSM services which do not expect arbitrary amounts of user data, only have 
to provide an API Csm_<Service>(). These services have to be handled as 
simple function calls. 
CSM services which expect arbitrary amounts of user data (as in the case of 
this work), shall provide the APIs Csm_<Service>Start(), 
Csm_<Service>Update() and Csm_<Service>Finish(). All applications have 
to follow the rules presented by the next sections. 
5.3.1 Initialization 
The application calls the Csm_<Service>Start() request, passing a valid 
service configuration to the start function. The start function checks the 
validity of the configuration received.  
If an instance of the service is being processed, the start function returns 
CSM_E_BUSY. If no instance of the service is being processed when the 
Csm_<Service>Start() is called, the function configures the CSM 
immediately and return the status of the service. 
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5.3.2 Update 
The application calls the Csm_<Service>Update() request, passing data 
which are necessary for the computation of the service to the update 
function. The update function checks whether the current service is already 
initialized. If the service is not yet initialized, the update function returns 
E_NOT_OK. 
The CSM assumes that the data provided to the Csm_<Service>Update() will 
not change until it returns. 
If the service has been initialized, the update function immediately 
processes the given data and return the status of the update. 
5.3.3 Finish 
The application calls the Csm_<Service>Finish() request, passing the result 
buffer and optional data which is necessary for the finishing of the 
cryptographic service to the finish function.  
The finish function checks whether the current service is already initialized. 
If it has not been initialized before, the finish function returns E_NOT_OK. If 
the service has been initialized before, the finish function shall immediately 
process the given data, finish the computation of the current cryptographic 
service, store the result in the result buffer and returns the status of the 
finish function. 
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The CSM assumes that the data provided to the Csm_<Service>Finish() will 
not change until it returns. 
5.4 API TYPES 
This section will explore all the types and data structure used for the 
implementation the cryptographic modules. 
5.4.1 Enumerators and typedef 
The starting point to describe the API types, are the description of all the 
enumerators and typedefs used. The list of the typedefs follows: 
 typedef uint16 Csm_ConfigIdType: numeric ID of a CSM service 
configuration, unique within the service; 
 typedef uint8 Csm_AlignType: scalar type which has maximum 
alignment restrictions on the given platform. This value is configured 
by the CsmMaxAlignScalarType. 
The return type of the API implemented is of type Std_ReturnType, which 
can assume the following values: 
 E_OK: all the computations have been completed correctly; 
 E_NOT_OK: an error occurs; 
 CSM_E_BUSY: the cryptographic service is already serving another 
client. 
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In case of a MAC verification, the result is of type Csm_VerifyResultType, 
which can assume the following values: 
 CSM_E_VER_OK: verification correct; 
 CSM_E_VER_NOT_OK: verification failed. 
5.4.1.1 Csm_<Service>ConfigType 
A data structure containing all information needed to specify a 
cryptographic service. It can be seen as a “context” for the services. It 
contains the fields shown in Table 10. 
Type Name Description 
Csm_ConfigIdType ConfigId Numeric 
identifier of a 
configuration 
Std_ReturnType *PrimitiveStartFct(<primitive 
parameter list>) 
Pointer to the 
start 
primitive 
function. The 
parameters are 
the same of the 
caller 
function. 
Std_ReturnType *PrimitiveUpdateFct(<primitive 
parameter list>) 
Pointer to the 
update 
primitive 
function. The 
parameters are 
the same of the 
caller 
function. 
Std_ReturnType *PrimitiveFinishFct(<primitive 
parameter list>) 
Pointer to the 
finish 
primitive 
function. The 
parameters are 
the same of the 
caller 
function. 
Void  *PrimitiveConfigPtr Pointer to the 
configuration 
of the 
underlying 
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cryptographic 
primitive. 
Table 10: elements of the service configuration structure. 
5.4.1.2 Cry_<Primitive>ConfigType 
A data structure containing all information needed to specify a 
cryptographic primitive. It can be seen as a “context” for the primitive. The 
fields of this structure differs for each primitive, as, according to the 
AUTOSAR standard, they are implementation specific. 
5.5 SYMMETRICAL BLOCK INTERFACE 
A block cipher is a symmetric key cipher operating on a fixed-length blocks, 
with an unvarying transformation. A block cipher encryption algorithm 
takes a n-block of plaintext as input, and produces an output of n-bit block 
of ciphertext. The transformation is controlled by a second input: the secret 
key. 
Decryption is similar, the decryption algorithm takes as input a n-bit block 
of ciphertext and a secret key, and produce the original n-bit block plaintext. 
Next sections will present the specification of the functions used for 
encryption and decryption. 
5.5.1 Csm_SymBlockEncryptStart 
Service name Csm_SymBlockEncryptStart 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptStart( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const Csm_SymKeyType 
*keyPtr) 
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Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
keyPtr Pointer to the key structure, used 
by the encryption algorithm 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to initialize the symmetrical block 
encryption service of the CSM module. 
If the service is busy, the function returns CSM_E_BUSY. 
Otherwise the function stores the given configuration 
and call the Cry_<Primitive>Start of the primitive 
identified by the cfgId and return the value returned by 
that function. 
 
5.5.2 Csm_SymBlockEncryptUpdate 
Service name Csm_SymBlockEncryptUpdate 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptUpdate( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const uint8 
*plainTextPtr,      
    uint32 plainTextLength, uint8 *cipherTextPtr,  
    uint32 *cipherTextLengthPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
plainTextPtr Pointer to the plaintext buffer 
plainTextLength Length of the plaintext 
cipherTextPtr Pointer to the ciphertext buffer 
cipherTextLengthPtr Pointer to the memory location 
where the length of the ciphertext 
is stored. 
On calling, this parameter shall 
contain the size of the buffer 
provided by the cipherTextPtr. 
When the request has finished, 
the amount of data that has been 
encrypted shall be stored 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
Section 5: Crypto Service Manager implementation  
78 
 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to feed the symmetrical block 
encryption service with the input data. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Update 
and return the value returned by that function.  
5.5.3 Csm_SymBlockEncryptFinish 
Service name Csm_SymBlockEncryptFinish 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptFinish( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used finish the symmetrical block 
encryption service. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Finish 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
5.5.4 Csm_SymBlockDecryptStart 
Service name Csm_SymBlockDecryptStart 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockDecryptStart( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const Csm_SymKeyType 
*keyPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
keyPtr Pointer to the key structure, used 
by the encryption algorithm 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to initialize the symmetrical block 
decryption service of the CSM module. 
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If the service is busy, the function returns CSM_E_BUSY. 
Otherwise the function stores the given configuration 
and call the Cry_<Primitive>Start of the primitive 
identified by the cfgId and return the value returned by 
that function. 
 
5.5.5 Csm_SymBlockDecryptUpdate 
Service name Csm_SymBlockDecryptUpdate 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptUpdate( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const uint8 
*cipherTextPtr,      
    uint32 cipherTextLength, uint8 *plainTextPtr,  
    uint32 *plainTextLengthPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
cipherTextPtr Pointer to the ciphertext buffer 
cipherTextLength Length of the ciphertext 
plainTextPtr Pointer to the plaintext buffer 
plainTextLengthPtr Pointer to the memory location 
where the length of the plaintext 
is stored. 
On calling, this parameter shall 
contain the size of the buffer 
provided by the plainTextPtr. 
When the request has finished, 
the amount of data that has been 
decrypted shall be stored 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to feed the symmetrical block 
decryption service with the input data. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Update 
and return the value returned by that function.  
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5.5.6 Csm_SymBlockDecryptFinish 
Service name Csm_SymBlockDecryptFinish 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptFinish( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used finish the symmetrical block 
decryption service. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Finish 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
5.6 SYMMETRICAL INTERFACE 
The Symmetrical Interface implements an algorithm which uses identical 
cryptographic keys for both decryption and encryption. The keys are shared 
secret between two or more parties. 
Next sections will describe each of the function implemented. 
5.6.1 Csm_SymEncryptStart 
Service name Csm_SymEncryptStart 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymEncryptStart( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const Csm_SymKeyType 
*keyPtr,   
    const uint8 *InitVectorPtr, uint32 
InitVectorLength) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
keyPtr Pointer to the key structure, used 
by the encryption algorithm 
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InitVectorPtr Holds a pointer to the initialization 
vector used during the encryption 
computation 
InitVectorLength Holds the length of the 
initialization vector used during 
the encryption computation 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to initialize the symmetrical 
encryption service of the CSM module. 
If the service is busy, the function returns CSM_E_BUSY. 
Otherwise the function stores the given configuration 
and call the Cry_<Primitive>Start of the primitive 
identified by the cfgId and return the value returned by 
that function. 
 
5.6.2 Csm_SymEncryptUpdate 
Service name Csm_SymEncryptUpdate 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymEncryptUpdate( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const uint8 
*plainTextPtr,      
    uint32 plainTextLength, uint8 *cipherTextPtr,  
    uint32 *cipherTextLengthPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
plainTextPtr Pointer to the plaintext buffer 
plainTextLength Length of the plaintext 
cipherTextPtr Pointer to the ciphertext buffer 
cipherTextLengthPtr Pointer to the memory location 
where the length of the ciphertext 
is stored. 
On calling, this parameter shall 
contain the size of the buffer 
provided by the cipherTextPtr. 
When the request has finished, 
the amount of data that has been 
encrypted shall be stored 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
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E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to feed the symmetrical encryption 
service with the input data. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Update 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
5.6.3 Csm_SymEncryptFinish 
Service name Csm_SymEncryptFinish 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymEncryptFinish( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, uint8 *cipherTextPtr, 
    uint32 *cipherTextLengthPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
cipherTextPtr Holds a pointer to the memory 
location which will hold the 
encrypted text 
cipherTextLengthPtr Holds a pointer to the memory 
location which holds the length of 
the encrypted text.  
On calling, this parameter shall 
contain the size of the buffer 
provided by the cipherTextPtr. 
When the request has finished, 
the amount of data that has been 
encrypted shall be stored 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used finish the symmetrical encryption 
service. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Finish 
and return the value returned by that function.  
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5.6.4 Csm_DecryptStart 
Service name Csm_SymDecryptStart 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymDecryptStart( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const Csm_SymKeyType 
*keyPtr,   
    const uint8 *InitVectorPtr, uint32 
InitVectorLength) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
keyPtr Pointer to the key structure, used 
by the encryption algorithm 
InitVectorPtr Holds a pointer to the initialization 
vector used during the encryption 
computation 
InitVectorLength Holds the length of the 
initialization vector used during 
the encryption computation 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to initialize the symmetrical 
decryption service of the CSM module. 
If the service is busy, the function returns CSM_E_BUSY. 
Otherwise the function stores the given configuration 
and call the Cry_<Primitive>Start of the primitive 
identified by the cfgId and return the value returned by 
that function. 
 
5.6.5 Csm_SymDecryptUpdate 
Service name Csm_SymDecryptUpdate 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymDecryptUpdate( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const uint8 
*cipherTextPtr,      
    uint32 cipherTextLength, uint8 *plainTextPtr,  
    uint32 *plainTextLengthPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
plainTextPtr Pointer to the plaintext buffer 
plainTextLength Length of the plaintext. 
Section 5: Crypto Service Manager implementation  
84 
 
On calling, this parameter shall 
contain the size of the buffer 
provided by the plainTextPtr. 
When the request has finished, 
the amount of data that has been 
decrypted shall be stored 
cipherTextPtr Pointer to the ciphertext buffer 
cipherTextLengthPtr Pointer to the memory location 
where the length of the ciphertext 
is stored 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to feed the symmetrical decryption 
service with the input data. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Update 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
5.6.6 Csm_SymDecryptFinish 
Service name Csm_SymDecryptFinish 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymDecryptFinish( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, uint8 *plainTextPtr, 
    uint32 *plainTextLengthPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
plainTextPtr Holds a pointer to the memory 
location which will hold the 
encrypted text 
plainTextLengthPtr Holds a pointer to the memory 
location which holds the length of 
the decrypted text.  
On calling, this parameter shall 
contain the size of the buffer 
provided by the plainTextPtr. 
When the request has finished, 
the amount of data that has been 
decrypted shall be stored 
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Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used finish the symmetrical decryption 
service. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Finish 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
5.7 MAC INTERFACE 
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a short piece of information used 
to authenticate a message. A MAC algorithm accepts as input a secret key 
and an arbitrary-length message to be authenticated, and produces a MAC 
as output. The MAC protects the message both for authenticity and 
integrity, as only who possesses the secret key can verify the MAC and 
detect any changes to the message content. 
Next sections will describe each of the function implemented. 
5.7.1 Csm_MacGenerateStart 
Service name Csm_SymBlockDecryptStart 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockDecryptStart( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const Csm_SymKeyType 
*keyPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
keyPtr Pointer to the key structure, used 
by the encryption algorithm 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
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CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to initialize the MAC generate 
service of the CSM module. 
If the service is busy, the function returns CSM_E_BUSY. 
Otherwise the function stores the given configuration 
and call the Cry_<Primitive>Start of the primitive 
identified by the cfgId and return the value returned by 
that function. 
 
5.7.2 Csm_MacGenerateUpdate 
Service name Csm_SymBlockDecryptUpdate 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptUpdate( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const uint8 *dataPtr,      
    uint32 dataLength) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
dataPtr Pointer to the input buffer 
dataLength Length of the input buffer 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to feed the MAC generate service 
with the input data. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Update 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
5.7.3 Csm_MacGenerateFinish 
Service name Csm_MacGenerateFinish 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptFinish( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, uint8 *resultPtr,  
    uint32 *resultLengthPtr, boolean 
TruncationIsAllowed) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
 resultPtr Pointer to the output buffer 
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 resultLengthPtr Pointer to the length of the 
output buffer 
 TruncationIsAllowed TRUE: truncation is allowed 
FALSE: truncation not allowed 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used finish the MAC generation service. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Finish 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
5.7.4 Csm_MacVerifyStart 
Service name Csm_SymBlockDecryptStart 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockDecryptStart( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const Csm_SymKeyType 
*keyPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
keyPtr Pointer to the key structure, used 
by the encryption algorithm 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to initialize the MAC verification 
service of the CSM module. 
If the service is busy, the function returns CSM_E_BUSY. 
Otherwise the function stores the given configuration 
and call the Cry_<Primitive>Start of the primitive 
identified by the cfgId and return the value returned by 
that function. 
 
5.7.5 Csm_MacVerifyUpdate 
Service name Csm_SymBlockDecryptUpdate 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptUpdate( 
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    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, const uint8 *dataPtr,      
    uint32 dataLength) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
dataPtr Pointer to the input buffer 
dataLength Length of the input buffer 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used to feed the MAC verificatio service 
with the input data. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Update 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
5.7.6 Csm_MacVerifyFinish 
Service name Csm_MacGenerateFinish 
Syntax Std_ReturnType Csm_SymBlockEncryptFinish( 
    Csm_ConfigType cfgId, uint8 *MacPtr,  
    uint32 *MacLengthPtr, Csm_VerifyResultType 
*resultPtr) 
Parameters 
(in) 
cfgId Identifier of the CSM module 
configuration 
 MacPtr Pointer to the output buffer 
 MacLengthPtr Pointer to the length of the output 
buffer 
 resultPtr Pointer to the memory location of 
the result of the MAC verification. 
Return values Std_ReturnType E_OK: request successful 
E_NOT_OK: request failed 
CSM_E_BUSY: request failed, 
service is still busy 
Description The interface is used finish the MAC verification service. 
If the service is not busy, the function returns E_NOT_OK. 
Otherwise the function calls the Cry_<Primitive>Finish 
and return the value returned by that function.  
 
Section 5: Crypto Service Manager implementation  
89 
 
5.8 PRIMITIVES 
All functions above call inside their body a primitive. Primitives are divided 
in: 
 Cry_<Primitive>Start(); 
 Cry_<Primitive>Update(); 
 Cry_<Primitive>Finish(). 
Where the keyword <Primitive> is used for SymBlockEncrypt, 
SymBlockDecrypt, MacGenerate and MacVerify. 
All the primitives have the same argument and return type of the functions 
which call them. The only exception is for start primitives, which has a 
parameter of type const void *cfgPtr instead of Csm_ConfigIdType cfgId. 
When calling these APIs, the parameter cfgPtr has to point to a constant 
variable of type Cry_<Primitive>ConfigType, but need to be cast to const 
void *. Reason for this is to have common definition of the parameter list 
of this API for all primitives of one service, because in the structure 
Csm_<Service>ConfigType one element is a function pointer to this API. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis analyses the problem of security in automotive applications. In 
particular, integrity and confidentiality properties of inter-ECUs 
communications are addressed.   
An extension of the security modelling concepts currently available in 
AUTOSAR have been proposed. Developers specify integrity and 
confidentiality security requirements by adding security tags in the 
description field of AUTOSAR software components.  
A tool has been developed that, starting from the AUTOSAR model 
specification with the security annotations, automatically generates 
AUTOSAR security components that uses the services of the Crypto Service 
Manager (CSM) to satisfy the high level requirement provided by the user. 
Finally, following the standard specified for the AUTOSAR CSM, a Crypto 
Service Manager library has been developed. The library, accessible by the 
application layer, implements integrity by the mean of the MAC 
Generation/Verification Interface and confidentiality using the Symmetric 
Encryption/Decryption Interface. The library has been written in 
C-programming language and uses OpenSSL as cryptographic primitives. 
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As future work, the Crypto Service Manager library could be used for 
simulation purposes, in particular to measure the resilience to cyber-
attacks, and for performance evaluations. 
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